




The Quasar Case: Hidden Problems of
Employment, Immigration, and Tax Lawt
Foreign companies doing business through branches in the United States and
subsidiaries incorporated under the laws of the various states do so by virtue of
a series of friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCN) treaties. The FCN trea-
ties are designed to promote and protect both United States investments in
foreign countries and foreign investments in the United States.' The majority of
these treaties permit companies of either party to the treaty to utilize personnel
"of their choice" to protect their investments abroad. Various circuit courts of
appeals have reached different conclusions regarding the meaning of this lan-
guage as it relates to claims for discrimination under title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19642 and other civil rights laws and defenses that can be asserted in
connection with those claims.
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1. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Pub. No. 6565, COMMERCIAL TREATY PROGRAM OF TIE UNITED
STATES 4 (1958) ("[T]his country has followed a policy of welcoming foreign capital .... An
important element in the willingness of foreign venture capital to invest in the United States ... [is]
the existence of conditions of security for the investor and his enterprise."); Commercial Treaties:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4,
6 (1952) (statement of Harold F. Linder, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1988).
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The most recent decision to address the issue of the interrelationship between FCN
treaty rights and title VII defenses is that of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
In Fortino v. Quasar Co.,3 three former American managers at a branch of a Japanese-
owned U.S.-based subsidiary challenged their layoffs during a companywide reor-
ganization. The Seventh Circuit held that the commercial treaty entered into between
Japan and the United States conferred absolute immunity upon a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of a Japanese corporation to a claim of intentional national origin discrimi-
nation under title VII. In reversing the lower court, the Seventh Circuit held that "[tlhe
exercise of a treaty right may not be made the basis for inferring a violation of tide
VII. By virtue of the treaty, 'foreign businesses clearly have the right to choose citizens
of their own nation as executives because they are such citizens.' -4
Many have touted the Quasar decision as having far-reaching beneficial ram-
ifications for Japanese and other foreign corporations doing business in the
United States. Yet, however significant the decision may be for purposes of
analyzing national origin discrimination claims under title VII, closer analysis
reveals that it left many unanswered questions concerning the effect of treaty
language under other domestic antidiscrimination laws. In addition, Quasar
never addressed significant problems posed by tax and immigration laws for
foreign companies that choose to exercise their FCN treaty rights.
This article analyzes the current state of the law after Quasar, the effect of the
prohibitions against citizen discrimination under the Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act of 1986 (IRCA),5 and other ramifications of law affecting Japanese and other
foreign corporations doing business in the United States. In that regard, part I of this
article examines defenses available under title VII to foreign-owned corporations and
their subsidiaries operating in the United States. In particular, part I analyzes both
the lower court and Seventh Circuit decisions in Quasar and examines whether
current decisional law confers blanket immunity for discrimination under title VII;
whether rights conferred by the FCN treaties differ depending on whether the claim
of discrimination is modeled after the intentional discrimination or disparate impact
method of proof; and whether FCN treaty rights constitute a defense under title VII
for locally incorporated subsidiaries of foreign companies.
Part II of the article examines the effect of IRCA and later amendments. In
particular, part II examines the questions of whether IRCA's prohibition of
citizenship discrimination eclipses previously available defenses to discrimina-
tion claims against foreign-owned corporations and their subsidiaries; and
whether the fight conferred by FCN treaties to discriminate on the basis of
citizenship is limited by the type of visa held by the foreign national. Part III of
the article examines the effect of U.S. tax law for foreign corporations that
invoke FCN treaty rights as a defense to discrimination claims.
3. 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
4. Id. at 393, quoting MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1144 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989) (emphasis in original).
5. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (1988).
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I. Defenses Available Under Title VII to Foreign-Owned
Corporations and Their U.S.-Based Subsidiaries
A. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IN QUASAR
In order to evaluate the effect of the Seventh Circuit decision in Quasar, a
discussion of the lower court's decision in the case6 is warranted. As reported by
the district court, three American citizens sued Quasar Company, an unincor-
porated division of Matsushita Electric Corporation of America, a Delaware
corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Matsushita Electric Industrial
Company, Ltd. (MEI), a Japanese electronic company with headquarters in
Osaka, Japan. The employees had been managers of Quasar who sued for na-
tional origin discrimination in violation of title VII and for age discrimination in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).7 These former
managers brought the suit in connection with a reduction-in-force caused by the
company's adverse economic circumstances.
The age discrimination case was tried to a jury, which awarded $1,949,980 in
back pay and front pay8 damages, $467,650 in liquidated damages, 9 and attor-
neys' fees. The title VII national origin case was tried to the court, which, under
the law, was required to accept the credibility and various other factual deter-
minations of the jury in the age discrimination case. The court entered judgment
in favor of the American-born plaintiffs. '0
The court noted evidence of MEI's substantial involvement in the employment
decisions affecting Quasar employees that ultimately led to the lawsuit. The
decision to eliminate fixed costs by downsizing the work force was made by an
MEI employee who had risen through the ranks of MEI in Japan and had become
Quasar's executive vice president only a few months before the reorganization.
This same Japanese employee also excluded almost all non-Japanese members of
Quasar management from meetings concerning the reorganization.
6. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (1988).
8. Whereas "back pay" represents compensation and benefits that would have been received
from the time of termination to the time of the jury's actual award, "front pay" represents com-
pensation that a plaintiff could have expected to receive had he or she continued with the company.
Thus, for example, where executive or mid-level managers are involved, and few positions at those
levels exist within the job market, front pay damages can often be substantial. First, salaries of
executive and mid-level managers tend to be greater than those of lower level employees. Second,
front pay damages encompass compensation and benefits from the time of award through retirement
if a trier-of-fact should determine that the employee's former position was so unique that he or she
would not have been able to find substantially similar employment elsewhere. See Quasar, 751 F.
Supp. at 1306.
9. Liquidated damages in this case are similar to punitive damages in the sense that they are
imposed for the purpose of deterring the underlying misconduct in future employment decisions.
10. Under title VII, before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071, plaintiffs were entitled only to equitable relief (such as
reinstatement) and back pay damages. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, plaintiffs are
entitled to compensatory and punitive damages.
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The court concluded that the plaintiffs had been discriminated against because
of their American national origin based on the following facts:
(1) the three plaintiffs had received good performance evaluations;
(2) almost all non-Japanese members of Quasar's management were ex-
cluded from the decision-making process regarding Quasar operations
and the impending reorganization;
(3) Quasar did not terminate any managerial employees of Japanese na-
tional origin;
(4) Quasar paid these Japanese employees salaries greater than the com-
pensation of their American counterparts;
(5) the percentage of Quasar's managerial employees of Japanese national
origin after the reduction-in-force increased markedly;
(6) certain positions were reserved for or assigned to employees of Japanese
national origin;
(7) Quasar maintained a salary structure for its managerial employees of
Japanese national origin different from the salary structure for manage-
rial employees of American national origin by adjusting salaries on the
basis of whether a Japanese employee lived in an apartment or owned
a home, the size of the employee's family, and whether the employee's
children attended public or private schools;
(8) during the reduction-in-force, Quasar actually increased the salaries of
managerial employees of Japanese national origin;
(9) the terminated American employees were capable of performing the job
duties of many of the positions that were performed by the Japanese
managerial employees, and yet, were not offered any of these positions;
and
(10) Quasar took no action to ensure that the reduction-in-force did not ad-
versely affect managerial employees based upon their national origin,
although the company was aware of its obligations under title VII, yet
acted in reckless disregard of the law.
In analyzing the title VII claims, the court concurred with the jury's finding on
the age discrimination claim that Quasar's "dire-financial-condition" defense
was either incredible or a pretext for its discriminatory conduct. The court
specifically found that Quasar had discriminated by reserving certain of its man-
agerial positions for employees of Japanese national origin, by evaluating and
paying Quasar's managerial employees of Japanese national origin on an entirely
different basis from that used to evaluate and pay American managerial employ-
ees, and by exempting all of its managerial employees of Japanese national
origin from the reduction-in-force.
In particular, the court found that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie
case by showing that they were members of a protected group (here, persons of
American national origin); that they were performing according to Quasar's
legitimate expectations; that Quasar terminated their employment; and that sim-
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ilarly situated managerial employees of Japanese national origin were treated
more favorably.
Having established the necessary elements of a prima facie case, the burden
shifted to Quasar to articulate lawful reasons for the plaintiffs' terminations. In
defense, Quasar relied on evidence that it had discharged the plaintiffs because
of its dire financial condition and because the ability to speak Japanese was
necessary to perform in positions reserved for managerial employees of Japanese
national origin.
Since the plaintiffs had articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for the dis-
charges, the burden shifted back to the plaintiffs to demonstrate that Quasar's
articulated reasons were a pretext for discrimination. The court noted that pretext
could be demonstrated by the plaintiffs by showing either: (1) that the discrim-
inatory reason more likely than not motivated Quasar to implement the employ-
ment decision, or (2) that Quasar's explanation was not credible. Thus, once
Quasar offered the nondiscriminatory reason, the real issue in the case became
one of sufficient evidence of pretext.
In determining that Quasar's proffered reasons were in fact pretextual, the
court relied on every factor enumerated above. In addition, the court concluded
that Quasar's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the discharges-the need to
speak Japanese-was pretextual. The court reached this conclusion because the
plaintiffs had demonstrated that many American managerial employees who did
not speak Japanese performed the marketing, financial, and managerial duties
that Quasar suddenly contended could only be performed by employees of Jap-
anese national origin. In addition, the court found particularly persuasive Qua-
sar's attempt to defend its employment decision based on speculation that the
plaintiffs would refuse to relocate to take other positions in the company even
though Quasar had never consulted the plaintiffs regarding their willingness to do
SO.
Quasar did not raise FCN treaty rights as a defense to discrimination claims
in the lower courts; rather, it raised them as a defense for the first time on appeal
in the Seventh Circuit. Thus, the lower court applied the traditional analysis of
the burdens and evidence relating to title VII claims. What is important about the
lower court's decision is that, following traditional title VII analysis and absent
invocation of FCN treaty rights, the facts of this case are so clear-cut that they
virtually compel a finding of discrimination.
B. THE SEVENTH CIRcuT's DECISION IN QUASAR
On appeal of the lower court's decision, Quasar argued a novel theory not
raised in the lower court. Quasar argued that the discrimination, if any, was
based on the foreign citizenship, rather than the national origin, of the Japanese
nationals who were employed temporarily in the United States. Quasar further
argued that its discrimination on the basis of citizenship was permitted by the
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terms of the FCN treaty between the United States and Japan, which provides
that "companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the terri-
tories of the other Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive
personnel, attorneys, agents, and other specialists of their choice." 11
The Seventh Circuit noted that Quasar marketed in the United States products
made in Japan by MEI, and that after Quasar suffered substantial losses, MEI
assigned several of its own financial and marketing executives to Quasar on a
temporary basis. Although these persons were employees of Quasar and under its
day-to-day control, they also retained their status as employees of MEL. MEI, not
Quasar, evaluated their performance, kept their personnel records, fixed their
salaries, and assisted with relocation of their families to the United States during
the period of assignment. They entered the country under E- 1 (Treaty Trader) or
E-2 (Treaty Investor) temporary visas.
The Seventh Circuit held that although Quasar had demonstrated favoritism
towards employees of Japanese national origin, the favoritism was based on
citizenship, which was authorized by the FCN treaty and by virtue of the em-
ployees' special status as foreign executives under the test articulated above.
Quasar therefore had not discriminated on the basis of national origin. Because
title VII does not forbid discrimination on the grounds of citizenship and plain-
tiffs had alleged only discrimination on the basis of national origin (and age), the
Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court's finding of national origin discrimi-
nation and remanded with directions to enter judgment for Quasar on the title VII
national origin discrimination claims. 12
In arriving at this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the high rate
of correlation between national origin discrimination and citizenship discrimi-
nation. However, the court reasoned that to permit this correlation to support an
inference of national origin discrimination when a federal treaty actually permits
preference for Japanese citizens (who happen also to be of Japanese national
origin) would nullify the treaty. Moreover, the court emphasized that citizenship
and national origin discrimination cannot be equated for purposes of title VII
claims under either method of proof for title VII claims-intentional discrimi-
nation or disparate impact discrimination. Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that "foreign businesses clearly have the right to choose citizens of their own
nation as executives because they are such citizens," emphasizing that title VII
cannot take back from the Japanese with one hand what the FCN treaty had given
with the other. 13
Indeed, the court noted that the FCN treaty works to the advantage of both
Japanese and American executives: "There are Americans employed abroad by
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies who, but for the Treaty, would lose their
11. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063,
2070.
12. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 392, 399 (7th Cir. 1991).
13. Id. at 392-93.
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jobs to foreign nationals." The Seventh Circuit observed that U.S. insistence,
over the objections of Japan, had caused the insertion of the provision into the
FCN treaty in the first instance.14
More significantly, the court appeared to reason that even if the plaintiffs had
been of Japanese ancestry, the fact that they were not executives of MEl would
have required the same result. Because MEI was authorized by the U.S.-Japan
FCN Treaty to utilize "executive personnel. . . of their choice," and MEI chose
to utilize their own personnel rather than those of Quasar, discrimination was not
unlawful for title VII purposes. The court reversed the lower court's holding and
directed the lower court to dismiss the title VII claims of national origin dis-
crimination altogether:
[T]here is no evidence of discrimination here save what is implicit in wanting your own
citizens to run your foreign subsidiary. There is no evidence that if John Fortino had had
three or for that matter four Japanese grandparents he would not have been fired. No
favoritism was shown Quasar's Japanese-American employees, which would have been
true national-origin discrimination since they are not citizens of Japan; and whatever his
ancestry, [a plaintiff] would have had the irremedial disability of not being an executive
of [MEI]. That was the real source of the "prejudice" against him, and it is not
prejudice based on national-origin. It may have had a similar effect to national-origin
prejudice (though not identical-for look what happened to Quasar's Japanese-
American employees) because of the correlation between citizenship and national or-
igin, but the treaty prevents equating the two forms of discrimination or, what as a
practical matter would amount to the same thing, allowing the first to be used to prove
the second.' 5
The Seventh Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the FCN treaty
protects only foreign corporations, and not American subsidiaries of foreign
corporations. The plaintiffs' argument had relied on a prior decision, Sumitomo
Shoji American, Inc. v. Avagliano, 16 in which the Supreme Court held that
American subsidiaries of foreign parents were not protected by the provisions of
the U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty. However, the Seventh Circuit distinguished the
factual circumstances that led to that holding from those in Quasar on the
grounds that in Sumitomo there had been no contention that the parent corpora-
tion dictated the discriminatory conduct of the subsidiary, whereas that was
precisely the case in Quasar.
Thus, under the Seventh Circuit's analysis, when the parent corporation has
dictated the subsidiary's allegedly discriminatory conduct, the subsidiary may
assert any of its parent corporation's FCN treaty rights necessary to protect rights
conferred by the treaty. Because a court determination that would forbid Quasar
from giving preferential treatment to Japanese citizen executives would have the
same effect on MEI-preventing MEI from sending its own executives to man-
age Quasar in preference to employing American citizens in these positions-
Quasar was permitted to invoke MEI's FCN treaty rights.
14. Id. at 393-94.
15. Id. at 393.
16. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
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The authors understand from the plaintiffs' counsel that the Quasar case has
now been settled; thus the issues it raises will not be resolved by the Supreme
Court.
C. DISCRIMINATION LAW UNDER TITLE VII AFTER QUASAR: THE
EFFECT ON FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AND THEIR U.S. SUBSIDIARIES
The majority of courts addressing the issue of whether the FCN treaties confer
blanket immunity have rejected the proposition that a foreign-owned employer
may discriminate on the basis of race, national origin, or some other prohibited
basis so long as it discriminates in favor of an executive who is a citizen of the
foreign country involved.
1. The Majority Rule: Treaty Rights Do Not Confer
Blanket Immunity for Discrimination Against Executives
A superficial reading of the Seventh Circuit decision in Quasar might leave
one with the impression that national origin or race discrimination are permis-
sible so long as the discrimination is dictated by a Japanese parent corporation in
favor of executives who are Japanese citizens. The court's analysis in Quasar,
however, left open the question of whether the FCN treaty confers blanket
immunity upon Japanese companies that actually discriminate on some basis
prohibited by title VII.
The court expressly declined to address the hypothetical question of whether
a Japanese corporation could lawfully discriminate because it is prejudiced
against non-Japanese persons. 17 The Seventh Circuit concluded that it need not
make this determination because no evidence of discrimination had been pre-
sented by these particular plaintiffs other than "what is implicit in wanting your
own citizens to run your foreign subsidiary."' 8 Specifically, the court relied on
the lack of favoritism shown to Quasar's Japanese-American employees,' 9 rea-
soning that such favoritism would have constituted true national origin discrim-
ination since the Japanese-American employees were not also citizens of Japan.
The significance to foreign-owned businesses of leaving this question open is
that even under the Seventh Circuit's analysis, where citizenship discrimination
authorized by the FCN treaty is used as a pretext for national origin or some other
prohibited discrimination, a foreign-owned company or its subsidiary may nev-
ertheless be liable under title VII or other applicable discrimination law. 20 Thus,
17. Quasar, 950 F.2d at 393.
18. Id.
19. In this regard, the court noted that two out of three of the nonmanagerial employees who had
been laid off in the reduction-in-force were Japanese-Americans. Id. at 392.
20. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 91 (1973) (although citizenship discrimina-
tion does not constitute national origin discrimination for title VII purposes, title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of citizenship whenever it has the purpose or effect of discriminating on
the basis of national origin).
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while it appears from a superficial reading of the decision that the Seventh Circuit
has conferred a blanket immunity (at least where executive and other specialized
personnel are concerned), this particular part of the court's analysis reopens
every such decision made by a foreign company, leaving such companies open
to liability under domestic discrimination laws.
Similarly, in MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines,2 1 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that the only right granted by the particular FCN treaty was
the right to choose one's own citizens because of their citizenship. Thus, the
U.S.-Korean FCN Treaty did not confer the right to choose one's citizen over a
citizen of the host country because of the race, national origin, or age of that
citizen. In MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, six American managers, including
the plaintiff, were discharged as part of a reorganization and replaced with four
Korean citizens. The plaintiff alleged race, national origin, and age discrimina-
tion under title VII and the ADEA given that all of the American sales managers
were replaced by Koreans.
Korean Air Lines argued that the U.S.-Korean FCN Treaty immunized the
company from liability for race or national origin discrimination under title VII
and for age discrimination under the ADEA with respect to any decision regard-
ing executive personnel that favored a citizen of its own nation. Thus, Korean
Air Lines contended in effect that such a decision by a foreign company could
never be the subject of a title VII or ADEA lawsuit.22
The court rejected that analysis as overly simplistic. The court examined in
depth the history underlying the negotiations that led to the treaty provision in
question and concluded that the intent was not to eclipse domestic discrimination
laws altogether. Although U.S. investors feared laws limiting the employment of
U.S. citizens or requiring the employment of locals in U.S. companies abroad,
the court held that nothing in the history of negotiations supported the conclusion
that the parties to the FCN treaty had negotiated for an exemption from the laws
prohibiting race, national origin, and age discrimination.
23
Thus, the court concluded that the only right granted by the FCN treaty was
the right to choose one's own citizens because of their citizenship. The FCN
treaty specifically did not confer the right to choose one's own citizen over a
citizen of the host country because of the race, national origin, or age of that
citizen. 24 Simply put, this holding means that if a plaintiff can prove that an
employment decision favoring an executive who is a Japanese citizen stems from
a desire to discriminate on the basis of race, national origin, or ancestry, and not
from a desire to utilize Japanese citizens because the Japanese-owned employer
prefers to have its business managed by its own nationals, the plaintiff will likely
21. 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 904 (1989).
22. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1144.
23. Id. at 1144-47.
24. Id. at 1144, 1146.
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prevail on his or her discrimination claims notwithstanding the existence of the
25FCN treaty protections.
In Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. ,26 an action brought by female
secretaries to challenge an allegedly discriminatory policy of filling management
positions exclusively with male Japanese nationals, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that Japanese citizenship constituted a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion (BFOQ)27 exception to discrimination prohibitions. The court rejected the
contention that the FCN treaty conferred upon the company the freedom to
violate domestic antidiscrimination laws. Thus, under the test set forth in Sum-
itomo, the employer would be required to demonstrate, in addition to the fact that
persons favored by the employment decision in question were Japanese nation-
als, the unique requirements of a Japanese company doing business in the United
States, including such factors as a person's: "(1) Japanese linguistic and cultural
skills; (2) knowledge of Japanese products, markets, customs, and business
practices; (3) familiarity with the personnel and workings of the principal or
parent enterprise in Japan; and (4) acceptability to those persons with whom the
company or branch does business."28
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit de-
cision on other grounds. However, the Court strongly suggested in dictum that
if squarely presented with the issue of blanket immunity, it would reject that
interpretation of the FCN treaties because "[t]he purpose of the Treaties was not
to give foreign corporations greater rights than domestic companies, but instead
to assure them the right to conduct business on an equal basis without suffering
discrimination based on their alienage.
' 29
As the Third Circuit recognized in MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, the Second
Circuit's modified BFOQ approach, requiring an employer to establish that use
of the foreign managers was reasonably necessary to the success of the foreign
business, imposes a considerably more difficult burden than that imposed on
employers under the Third and Sixth Circuit rules in which the issue is simply
whether the foreign corporation favored its own citizens because they were its
citizens. 30 Moreover, other authority takes issue with the last prong of the test.
Under the law of the Ninth Circuit, for example, the last prong of the Second
Circuit test-acceptability to those persons with whom the company or branch
does business-is a criterion on which employers may not rely to defend a
25. Id. at 1147.
26. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
27. Title VII expressly excepts from the operation of antidiscrimination laws "those certain
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)
1988.
28. Sumitomo. 638 F.2d at 559.
29. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 187-88.
30. MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1146-47 n.14.
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discrimination claim. 31 Thus, whether the Second Circuit test is still good law
after the Supreme Court's dictum on appeal and in light of the Ninth Circuit's
disapproval of the last prong of the test, remains to be seen.
In Wickes v. Olympic Airways,3 2 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying
Michigan law, rejected a foreign employer's argument that an FCN treaty con-
ferred complete immunity from claims of employment discrimination on the
basis of age and national origin. The Sixth Circuit consequently reversed the
lower court's determination that the plaintiff's claims were barred as a matter of
law. The court deferred to the interpretation of the State Department and the
Supreme Court's dictum in Sumitomo in concluding that the privilege to dis-
criminate on the basis of citizenship was a narrow one permitting foreign cor-
porations to "employ Greek citizens for certain high level positions, not a
wholesale immunity from compliance with labor laws prohibiting other forms of
employment discrimination." 33 Thus, the court held that, "[t]o the extent that
plaintiff may claim on remand that Greek citizenship and national origin are
synonymous and that Michigan law prevents Olympic from giving preference to
Greek citizens in management and technical positions, such a claim would con-
flict with the Treaty, and the Treaty would prevail."
3 4
In Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America),3 5 a divided Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that an FCN treaty provides a foreign subsidiary with an absolute
exemption from domestic employment discrimination laws and, therefore, a
complete defense to discrimination claims in which employees alleged that pro-
motions and benefits were made available only to Japanese employees. 3 6 Under
the Fifth Circuit's reasoning the absolute language of the citizenship-preference
provisions in the U.S. -Japan FCN Treaty reflected the intent of the negotiators to
completely insulate an employer from domestic antidiscrimination laws in the
hiring of executives. The Fifth Circuit came to this conclusion because of the
FCN treaty's provisions elsewhere for equal (or national) treatment of all par-
ties.3 7 By contrast, the court reasoned that selection of the phrase "of their
choice" in the U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty "means exactly what it says: Companies
have a right to decide which executives and technicians will manage their in-
vestment in the host country, without regard to host country laws." 3 8 The Fifth
Circuit's complete immunity rule is unlikely to prevail, however, since it was
decided before the Supreme Court declared in Sumitomo that the purpose of the
31. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'g 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1162 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
32. 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984).
33. Id. at 365 (emphasis in original).
34. Id. at 368.
35. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
36. Spiess, 643 F.2d at 359.
37. Id. at 360.
38. Id. at 361.
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FCN treaties was not to confer on foreign corporations greater rights than those
enjoyed by domestic companies.
2. The Treaty May Confer Absolute Immunity for Disparate
Impact Discrimination Claims Under Title VII
Although a majority of courts have concluded that a foreign corporation may
not intentionally discriminate against executives on some basis prohibited by
American employment laws (other than citizenship), a different treatment may be
afforded to discrimination claims predicated on a disparate impact mode of
proof. Title VII and the ADEA extend beyond those discriminatory practices that
purposely discriminate (the intentional discrimination method of proof) to those
practices that, although they do not discriminate on their face, are discriminatory
in effect or operation (disparate impact analysis). Under the disparate impact
model, title VII and ADEA liability can be found where facially neutral em-
ployment practices have a discriminatory effect or "disparate impact" on pro-
tected groups even in the absence of proof that the employer harbored a dis-
criminatory motive for adopting the practices. 39
In establishing a disparate impact discrimination claim, plaintiffs generally
rely almost exclusively on statistical evidence that reflects a disproportionate
effect of the challenged facially neutral policy on protected groups and on the
competing explanations for those disparities. 4° A discrimination claim based on
the allegation that all American managers were replaced by foreign nationals
arguably states a discrimination claim under both the intentional and disparate
impact models of proof. But, when an FCN treaty has conferred on a foreign
corporation the right to utilize executives "of their choice," the exercise of that
choice, by itself, could likely result in a statistical disparity, given that the
populations of many foreign countries are largely homogeneous. Thus, as the
Third Circuit recognized:
Because a company's requirement that its employees be citizens of the homogeneous
country from which it hails means that almost all of its employees will be of the same
national origin and race, the statistical disparity between otherwise qualified non-
citizens of a particular race and national origin, and citizens of the foreign country's
race and national origin is likely to be substantial. 4'
For this reason, the Third Circuit has held that disparate impact liability under title
VII and the ADEA' for a foreign employer based on its practice of engaging its own
nationals as managers cannot be reconciled with the citizenship-preference provi-
sions of the FCN treaty and that liability may, therefore, not be imposed.42
Moreover, the drafters of the FCN treaties expressly intended in their nego-
tiations leading to the FCN treaties that foreign corporations operating in the
39. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1988).
40. Id.
41. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 904 (1989).
42. Id.
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United States not be subject to percentile restrictions. In commenting on the
differences between the FCN treaties and their predecessors, one commentator
has stated that "management is assured freedom of choice in the engaging of
essential executive and technical employees in general, regardless of their na-
tionality, without legal interference from 'percentile' restrictions and the
like .. . Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that the treaty may confer
absolute immunity for foreign corporations to disparate impact discrimination
claims.
3. Treaty Rights May Not Be a Defense Under Title V1I for
Locally Incorporated Subsidiaries of Foreign Companies
In Quasar, the Seventh Circuit held that a subsidiary incorporated under the
laws of the United States could invoke the citizenship-preference FCN treaty
rights of its parent foreign corporation where the parent had "dictated" the
subsidiaries' conduct that was at issue in the lawsuit. 44 The court found that the
conduct in question was "dictated" by virtue of a foreign corporation (MEI)
sending financial and marketing executives to Quasar to assume key managerial
roles to prevent a recurrence of losses and to reorganize the company. Thus, the
reduction-in-force, engineered and implemented by the Japanese-citizen person-
nel, generated the claims of national origin and age discrimination.
The Seventh Circuit held that the subsidiary could invoke its parent's FCN
treaty rights because the parent had dictated the conduct. The Seventh Circuit
came to this conclusion notwithstanding a prior unanimous Supreme Court de-
cision, Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano,45 which rejected the con-
tention that article VIII(1) of the FCN treaty provided a defense for locally
incorporated subsidiaries of foreign companies in title VII actions.
The Sumitomo Court further reasoned that article XXII(3) of the treaty ex-
pressly rendered subsidiary corporations incorporated under laws of the host
countries companies of the United States, and not of Japan: "Companies con-
stituted under the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of either
Party shall be deemed companies thereof and shall have their juridical status
recognized within the territories of the other Party."
46
43. Herman Walker, Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment:
Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 234 (1956). See, e.g., Foreign Service
Dispatch No. 914 from the U.S. Embassy, Brussels, to Dep't of State, Mar. 11, 1955 ("The Belgians
then proposed to clarify the wording [of article VIII(l)] by inserting a local laws clause; but the U.S.
side replied that such a broad exception would leave the way open for precisely the abuse the sentence
was designed to correct, namely, 'percentile' laws and other governmental fiats circumscribing
freedom of choice of high-grade personnel on a purely nationality basis."); Foreign Service Dispatch
No. 144 from the U.S. Embassy, The Hague, to Dep't of State, Aug. 16, 1954 ("the big problem
to which [article VIII(I)] was addressed was so-called percentile legislation").
44. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1989).
45. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
46. Id. at 182, quoting FCN treaty, supra note 11, at art. XXII(3) (emphasis by the Court).
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The Court also rejected the subsidiary's argument that it was the intent of the
parties to the treaty to cover subsidiaries regardless of their place of incorpora-
tion. In that regard, the Court observed that, far from conferring an advantage on
covered businesses, it was the intent of the FCN treaty to establish parity with
domestic businesses:
The primary purpose of the corporation provisions of the Treaties was to give corpo-
rations of each signatory legal status in the territory of the other party, and to allow
them to conduct business in the other country on a comparable basis with domestic
firms ...
* ' ' The purpose of the Treaties was not to give foreign corporations greater rights
than domestic companies, but instead to assure them the right to conduct business on
an equal basis without suffering discrimination based on their alienage. 47
Thus, the purpose of the treaties was accomplished by affording each party to
the treaties "national" treatment, that is, equal treatment with domestic corpo-
rations.
The Seventh Circuit decision in Quasar justified its holding that the locally
incorporated subsidiary could invoke article VIII(l) rights on the ground that the
Supreme Court had left open the question of whether a subsidiary might invoke
those rights when the parent had dictated the discriminatory conduct of the
parent, stating that
the Court left open the question whether the subsidiary might in such a case assert any
of its parent treaty rights. We think it must be allowed to in a case such as this, at least
to the extent necessary to prevent the treaty from being set at naught. A judgment that
forbids Quasar to give preferential treatment to the expatriate executives that its parent
sends would have the same effect on the parent as it would have if it ran directly against
the parent: it would prevent Matsushita from sending its own executives to manage
Quasar in preference to employing American citizens in these posts.49
However, reference to the Sumitomo footnote relied on by the Seventh Circuit
reveals that the footnote fails to support such a proposition. Footnote 19 of the
Supreme Court decision simply states, in part: "We also express no view as to
whether Sumitomo may assert any Article VIII(l) rights of its parent." 50 To
hold, as did the Seventh Circuit, that this language confers article VIII(l) pro-
tections on a locally incorporated subsidiary where the parent has "dictated" the
discrimination at issue appears to stretch the proposition stated by the Court out
of proportion to the language of the footnote. Moreover, one could argue from
the absence of a specific provision in the treaty enabling subsidiaries to invoke
47. 457 U.S. at 185-88.
48. Id. at 188 n. 18. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Sumitomo had reached the opposite
conclusion, reasoning that a contrary finding would result in a "crazy-quilt pattern" in which
branches of Japanese companies would be able to operate at great advantage over locally incorporated
subsidiaries of foreign companies. 638 F.2d at 556. The Supreme Court, however, reasoned that the
"only significant advantage" to branches vis-A-vis subsidiaries of Japanese companies would be that
conferred by article VIII(l). 457 U.S. at 189.
49. Quasar, 950 F.2d at 393 (citations omitted).
50. 457 U.S. at 189-90 n.19.
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their parents' treaty rights that no such right was intended. Although the treaty
makes reference on several occasions to companies or enterprises controlled by
foreign companies, 51 no provision authorizes subsidiary invocation of parental
rights.
Nevertheless, one commentator argues that because there is precedent in the
lower courts for holding foreign parent companies liable for discriminatory acts
of their subsidiaries, subsidiary corporations ought to be able to invoke the treaty
rights of foreign parents.52 The proposition that U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
corporations can invoke their parents' treaty rights is an unsettled area of the law
that awaits further elucidation by the Supreme Court.
4. Analysis of Employment Law After Quasar
The foregoing analysis clearly indicates that the law on the force and effect in
discrimination actions of treaty language allowing foreign corporations to choose
executive personnel without liability for national origin discrimination is in a
state of flux. The issue will not be finally decided until the U.S. Supreme Court
directly addresses it. The Supreme Court has already suggested in dictum that
FCN treaties do not afford blanket immunity for discrimination by foreign coun-
tries and their affiliates even with respect to decisions regarding executive em-
ployees. The majority of circuit courts of appeals have adopted a rule similar to
Quasar that would allow foreign-owned companies to discriminate in favor of
foreign citizens in employment decisions affecting executive and similar em-
ployees.
However, those courts would still require defendants in discrimination actions
to defend against plaintiffs' claims that it was an employer's purpose to discrim-
inate on the basis of some prohibited criterion other than citizenship, such as race
or national origin. Because intent is difficult to determine and necessarily sub-
jective, the practical effect of the majority rule will be to require courts to
consider other evidence of discriminatory practices as probative of the issue of
whether it was the intent to discriminate on the basis of race or national origin.
Thus, even though the majority rule allows citizenship discrimination, it leaves
every other employment practice of foreign-owned businesses open to potential
scrutiny for national origin discrimination.
Moreover, the FCN treaties protect only decisions regarding executives and
selected technical personnel. Thus, a substantial majority of employment deci-
sions made by foreign-owned enterprises will be analyzed under traditional title
VII and section 1981 analysis. That analysis was applied in the lower court's
decision in Quasar. Given that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 has substantially
enlarged remedies available to discrimination victims and that the disparate im-
51. Id. at 182 n.8.
52. See Nobuhisa Ishizuka, Subsidiary Assertion of Foreign Parent Corporation Rights Under
Commercial Treaties to Hire Employees "Of Their Choice," 86 COLUM. L. REV. 139 (1986).
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pact mode of proof may be available to employees of even foreign-owned en-
terprises, foreign-owned employers would'be well advised to review all of their
employment practices and statistics for evidence of discrimination.
H. After Quasar: Unresolved United States
Immigration Law Problems Persist
Aside from suggesting but declining to resolve several intriguing questions of
employment law, the courts in Quasar likewise touched lightly upon but did not
address relevant issues of U.S. immigration law.
A. DOES IRCA PROHIBIT CITIZENSHIP DISCRIMINATION
THAT THE FCN TREATIES PERMIT?
In Quasar, the Seventh Circuit held in essence that the requirements of the
FCN treaties and title VII did not conflict because, although the FCN treaties
permit discrimination on the basis of citizenship, title VII does not prohibit
citizenship discrimination, but rather, prohibits only discrimination on the basis
of race, color, national origin, sex, and religion. Thus, although recognizing that
citizenship and national origin are "highly correlated," the court concluded that
"to use this correlation to infer national-origin discrimination from a treaty-
sanctioned preference for Japanese citizens who happen also to be of Japanese
national origin would nullify the treaty."
5 3
In 1986, however, Congress enacted IRCA, which includes a provision pro-
hibiting employment discrimination against U.S. citizens and nationals in hiring
and firing decisions. That section provides:
It is an unfair immigration-related employment practice for a person or other entity
to discriminate against any individual .. with respect to the hiring, or recruitment or
referral for a fee, of the individual for employment or the discharging of the individual
from employment-
(A) because of such individual's national origin, or
(B) in the case of a protected individual ... because of such individual's citizenship
status.5 4
What then is the effect, if any, of the prohibition against citizenship discrim-
ination on the requirements of the FCN treaty and decisions construing it that
have held that Japanese corporations may employ executives "of their choice,"
that is, Japanese citizens, in the United States?
The general rule is that the treaty must prevail in the absence of evidence
suggesting Congress intended subsequent legislation to affect existing treaty
53. Quasar, 950 F.2d at 392-93.
54. INA § 274B(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) 1988. The National Origin Discrimination Pro-
hibition of this section applies only to employers with four to fourteen employees; the citizenship
discrimination prohibition, however, applies to employers with four or more employees.
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rights and when the treaty conflicts with some other enactment. 55 Under the
analysis of the Seventh, Fifth, and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals, interpreting
the FCN treaties in question to permit citizenship discrimination, the treaty
language arguably conflicts with the provisions of IRCA within the meaning of
that general rule. Thus, if the literal requirements of the general rule apply here,
a foreign company's treaty rights would supersede IRCA's prohibitions against
citizenship discrimination for U.S. nationals, leaving the treaty rights intact.
However, the rules applicable to treaty interpretation are abstruse and complex
with respect to the circumstances under which subsequent federal legislation
preempts prior conflicting treaty provisions.
56
As we have seen above, courts have not automatically ruled out the application
of title VII prohibitions because title VII was enacted subsequent to the treaties
in question. Indeed, as demonstrated above, courts interpreting treaty rights in
conjunction with prohibitions contained in the subsequently enacted title VII
have come to different conclusions about the application of title VII prohibitions.
In Sumitomo, the Second Circuit concluded that the "of their choice" treaty
provisions do not constitute a license to violate domestic antidiscrimination
laws. 5 7 Thus, in Sumitomo it was only because the Second Circuit construed
treaty rights as a BFOQ, and not because title VII was enacted subsequent to the
treaty in question, that the plaintiffs did not prevail on their claim of national
origin discrimination. On the other hand, in Spiess, the Fifth Circuit held that the
"of their choice" provision of an FCN treaty was intended to establish "absolute
rules" that gave foreign nationals the right to control their overseas investments
without regard to domestic discrimination laws. 58
The cited section of IRCA, which prohibits citizenship discrimination, spe-
cifically excepts "discrimination because of citizenship status which is otherwise
required in order to comply with law, regulation, or executive order . . . . 59
It remains unclear whether treaty provisions permitting foreign FCN treaty
55. McCullough v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963);
MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1146 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 904
(1989).
56. James C. Wolf, Comment, The Jurisprudence of Treaty Interpretation, 21 U.C. DAvis L.
REV. 1023 (1988).
57. Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 558 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated,
457 U.S. 176 (1982).
58. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 360-61 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds,
457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
The outcome reached in each of the cases was dependent on whether the FCN treaty in question
was considered to confer "national" treatment. "National" treatment ensures that a foreign corpo-
ration will be accorded treatment that is equal to that afforded to domestic corporations. In this sense,
it is "contingent" upon treatment accorded to domestic corporations. "Noncontingent" treatment,
on the other hand, is treatment that guarantees the foreign company not only equal treatment, but
some absolute rights in addition. See Walker, supra note 43, at 232-33; Herman Walker, Jr., Modern
Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805, 810-11 (1958).
59. INA § 274B(a)(2)(C); 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(C) (1988).
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companies to discriminate on the basis of citizenship would satisfy this excep-
tion. On its face, the exception appears to be limited to those circumstances in
which citizenship discrimination is required by law. An inference can be drawn
from the analysis of the Seventh Circuit in Quasar, however, that even though
the right to discriminate on the basis of citizenship is permissive in the parent, it
may become binding by operation of law when the parent dictates the conduct of
the subsidiary.
Also unclear is whether the prohibition against citizenship discrimination con-
tained in IRCA was intended to apply to claims of discrimination by U.S.
citizens of American national origin in connection with the immigration of for-
eign nationals to be employed in foreign-owned companies in the United States.
The legislative history is devoid of any references to the intended effect of
IRCA's prohibition against citizenship discrimination on treaty rights of foreign
businesses. That history reflects an intent to minimize the anticipated employer
discrimination against "foreign-looking" job applicants (primarily Hispanic)
that would result from IRCA sanctions against employers knowingly hiring il-
legal aliens. 6° In addition, Congress clarified that the antidiscrimination provi-
sions were not intended to create a new civil rights law and were of a limited
nature. 6' In this regard, the antidiscrimination provisions will be in effect only
so long as employer sanctions against hiring illegal aliens are in effect.
62
On the other hand, the express provisions of the statute protect citizens and
nationals of the United States without limitation. 63 Congress could have provided
limitations preventing the statute from being used by U.S. citizens of American
national origin as a basis for a reverse discrimination action, but did not. Cer-
tainly, the provisions of title VII have not been construed to prohibit discrimi-
nation on the basis of race against Caucasians. Moreover, the Department of
Justice has instituted at least one charge before the Office of the Chief Admin-
istrative Hearing Officer under IRCA's enforcement provisions alleging a reverse
discrimination claim on the basis of citizenship status on behalf of U.S. citizens
against a defense contractor who recruited U.K. workers instead of making those
jobs available to U.S. citizens. 6 4
Accordingly, although Quasar held that FCN treaty rights confer the right to
discriminate on the basis of citizenship, it did so only in the context of a title VII
claim. Thus, whether IRCA's prohibitions against citizenship discrimination will
provide a basis for reverse discrimination actions by U.S. nationals remains to be
determined by a court of law.
60. 132 CONG. REc. 30,880, 30,905 (1986) (Conference Report); Nancy H. Montwieler, The
Immigration Reform Law of 1986: Analysis, Text and Legislative History 46-47 (BNA 1987).
61. Montwieler, supra note 60, at 49-50.
62. Id. at 48-49.
63. INA § 274B(a)(3)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3)(A) (1988).
64. United States v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, O.C.A.H.O. Case No. 90200363, re-
printed in 9 IMMIG. L. & PRAC. REP. B4-1 (1990).
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B. IMMIGRATION LAW CONSIDERATIONS IN QUASAR:
How FAR DOES FCN TREATY PROTECTION EXTEND?
The decisions in Quasar-both in the district court and court of appeals-
gave short shrift to the immigration law elements of FCN treaties. The decisions
apparently assumed without discussion that, so long as the Japanese citizen
personnel employed at Quasar held duly issued E-1 (Treaty Trader) or E-2
(Treaty Investor) visas, the parent company's preference for such individuals, by
reason of their citizenship, was protected under the U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty.
This section of the article examines relevant immigration law considerations
never addressed in Quasar. As the analysis shows, U.S. immigration law prin-
ciples may impose additional limitations on the apparent immunity over citizen-
ship preference decisions conferred by FCN treaties. An evaluation of immigra-
tion law suggests that, depending on the individual work visa status of particular
Japanese citizen employees, some personnel selection preferences may be pro-
tected under an FCN treaty while others may be held to violate U.S. discrimi-
nation laws.
C. THE "E" TREATY VISAS: A BRIEF PRIMER
As noted above, FCN treaties typically confer on a foreign parent company
authority to employ selected categories of personnel in its U.S. subsidiaries. The
U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty (article VIII) is typical; it allows foreign parent com-
panies to select "accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel,
attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice."
Congress has implemented this treaty right by enacting section 101(a)(15)(E)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 65 The statute allows the issuance
of visas under one of two work-authorized classifications (E-1 Treaty Trader or
E-2 Treaty Investor). E visas may be issued to nationals of a particular treaty
country who are or will become owners or qualifying employees in a U.S. -based
treaty enterprise.
E- 1 treaty trading entities must engage in trade conducted principally between
the United States and the treaty country. 66 E-2 treaty investment entities must
prove that an individual or entity possessing treaty nationality has invested or is
in the active process of investing a substantial amount of capital in a U.S.-based
commercial enterprise.
67
As authorized in regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of State
(DOS) at 22 C.F.R. section 41.51, and more extensively described in the For-
eign Affairs Manual, 68 E- 1 or E-2 visas may be issued to citizens of the treaty
65. INA § 101(a)(15); 8 U.S.C. § lI01(a)(15)(E) (1988).
66. INA § 101(a)(15)(E)(i); 8 U.S.C. § li01(a)(15)(E)(i) (1988).
67. INA § 101(a)(15)(E)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § I l01(a)(15)(E)(ii) (1988).
68. 9 FOR. AFF. MANUAL notes 1-5 to 22 C.F.R. § 41.51 (1991).
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country who will be engaged at the U.S. treaty enterprise in positions that are
(a) "executive" or "supervisory," or (b) "if. . . in a minor capacity," the visa
applicant must possess special qualifications that make the services to be ren-
dered "essential to the efficient operation of the business" (so-called "essential-
skills" personnel).69
The essential-skills subcategory is further divided into (a) individuals with
technical or specialized skills required by the U.S. treaty enterprise for a pro-
longed, typically indefinite period, and (b) subordinate personnel in the E-2 (but
not E-1) category, such as highly trained technicians or start-up workers, who
will train U.S. workers and then leave the United States within a relatively brief
period, usually not more than one year after entry.
E-1 and E-2 visas are obtained directly at U.S. embassies and consular posts
outside the United States, upon submission of (a) satisfactory evidence of the
required trading or investment activity and (b) proof of the individual visa ap-
plicant's qualifications for employment in the United States as an executive, a
supervisor, or a person with essential skills. Subject to rules of reciprocity
involving the length of visa validity for Americans seeking employment in the
treaty country, E visas are usually issued for multiple entry and are valid for up
to five years. Since applicants for E visas need not prove that they possess an
unrelinquished foreign residence, E visas are usually renewable indefinitely, and
thus, are typically considered long-term nonimmigrant visas.
Except in the case of E-2 start-up workers, the E visa stamp ultimately placed
in the applicant's passport usually bears no annotation identifying the particular
E-1 or E-2 visa subcategory (executive, supervisor, or essential skills) under
which the consular officer found the applicant qualified. Since the E visa stamp
offers no clue to the consul's determination concerning the relevant subcategory,
the mere fact that an individual is labeled as a manager or executive is not
necessarily determinative of the particular E-1 or E-2 visa subcategory. 70 Hence,
a person dubbed by the prospective U.S. employer as a "manager" could in fact
have been issued an E visa not by reason of any consular acknowledgment of the
applicant's supervisory responsibilities, but because the individual possessed
essential skills.
Unlike most work visa categories, the E visa categories require no prior
petition approval or prescreening by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS). Moreover, apparently because E visaholders enter the United States
under the protection of FCN treaties, they may only obtain the status of lawful
permanent resident in the United States by formally waiving "all rights,
privileges, exemptions and immunities under any law or executive order" that
would otherwise apply to the E visaholder by reason of his or her occupational
69. 22 C.F.R. § 41.51(c) (1991); 9 FOR. AFF. MANUAL notes 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 to 22 C.F.R.
§ 41.51 (1991).
70. 9 FOR. AFF. MANUAL note 3.4-2(a) to 22 C.F.R. § 41.51 (1991).
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status under the treaty visa category. 71 Aside from the E visa category, the
only other visaholders who must execute a similar waiver are those in categories
A (foreign government officials) or G (international organization representa-
tives).
Over the past few years, many applicants for U.S. work visas who might
arguably qualify for the E visa classification have elected not to apply, but instead
have sought other categories for entry to the United States. The most popular
alternatives have been the L-l (intracompany transferee) visa for executives,
managers, and persons with "specialized knowledge" and the H-1B (profes-
sional worker) visa-the latter being a category that is now less desirable be-
cause of recent legislation. 72 Preference for L- 1 or H-i B visas over E visas was
often due to two factors: (a) apparent or real difficulties in obtaining E visas from
U.S. consular officers, whose authority in adjudicating questions of fact has been
held to be virtually unreviewable;73 and (b) an internal DOS operating instruc-
tion that renders significantly more burdensome or impossible the attainment of
an L-1 visa if an earlier E visa application had been refused.74
This trend toward avoidance of E visas may be accelerated by two recent
developments in immigration law. First, both the INS and the DOS have pro-
posed E visa regulations that impose new, more burdensome-and at times
inconsistent-requirements for company qualification, trading and capital in-
vestment, and individual eligibility.75 The most ominous and onerous of these
proposals are that the U.S. treaty enterprise must (a) take reasonable and prompt
steps to transfer the essential skills held by E visaholders to its American work
force through proper training programs and (b) show that American workers are
unavailable to perform the duties of prospective E visa applicants. Thus, if a
shortage of U.S. workers or failure of the company to train Americans is estab-
lished, then the perpetually renewable E visa may soon become more short-term
in nature, and hence more undesirable.
71. INA § 247, 8 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988); INS Form 1-508.
72. The Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 205, 104 Stat. 4978, as amended by
Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-232, 105 Stat. 1733. See generally Angelo A. Paparelli & Mona D. Patel, The Immigration Act
of 1990: Death Knell for the H-IB?, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 29 (Jan. 14, 1991); Angelo A.
Paparelli & Charles H. Kuck, From "The Border of Death's Kingdom": Congress Resurrects the
H-IB Visa, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 21, 22 (June 1 & 8, 1992).
73. See generally Angelo A. Paparelli & Mitchell Tilner, A Proposal for Legislation Establish-
ing a System of Review of Visa Refusals in Selected Cases, 65 INTERPRETER RELEAsEs 1027 (Oct. 7,
1988).
74. 9 FOR. AFF. MANUAL note 4.6-3 to 22 C.F.R. § 41.54 (1991).
75. The INS proposed regulations regarding E visas are published in 56 Fed. Reg. 42,948,
42,952-57 (199 1) (proposed Aug. 30, 1991). The DOS proposed regulations are published in 56 Fed.
Reg. 43,565 et seq. (1991) (proposed Sept. 4, 1991). See generally Matter of Walsh & Pollard,
Interim Dec. 3111 (BIA 1988) (digested in 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 381-83 (Apr. 3, 1989));
H. Ronald Klasko, Proposed E Visa Regulations: No Treaty Between the INS and the State Depart-
ment, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1417 (Oct. 11, 1991).
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Second, the preferred alternative to the E visa, the L- 1 (intracompany trans-
feree) has been significantly liberalized under recent legislation. 76 L-1 visas are
now more easily obtained because of relaxed requirements for establishing eli-
gibility.77 The L-l visa can be used to authorize nonimmigrant status for as much
as five to seven years, 78 and in the case of managers and executives, now leads
to a relatively simple and straightforward route to obtaining U.S. permanent
residence. 79
Thus, time will tell whether more and more arguably qualified E visa appli-
cants will continue to pursue less burdensome and more attractive work visa
alternatives. Moreover, as discussed below, time will also tell whether the FCN
treaty's citizenship preference rights acknowledged in Quasar extend not only to
those who actually enter under the E visa classification, but also to those argu-
ably eligible to such classification who for reasons of convenience or practicality
enter the United States under some other work-authorized visa status.
D. THE QUASAR COURTS' TREATMENT OF
THE E VISA CATEGORY
In Quasar, both the trial and appellate courts seemed to gloss over the E visa
status of Quasar's Japanese employees and offered no significant analysis or
appreciation of relevant immigration law questions. The courts described the
Japanese employees' positions as either "executive" in the words of the appel-
late decision, or "managerial" as the district court characterized their status.
The courts also apparently assumed that, because the company identified the
Japanese employees' positions as managerial or executive and U.S. consular
officials issued E visas, more detailed immigration law inquiries were unneces-
sary. Further, without expressly addressing the duties of various Japanese em-
ployees, the court of appeals apparently assumed that such duties caused these
employees to be characterized as "executive personnel" for purposes of the
U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty.
By no means clear, however, is whether all individuals granted E visas by U.S.
consulates, particularly persons granted E-1 or E-2 essential-skills or E-2 start-up
visas, are automatically intended to be included in the citizenship preference provi-
sions of a particular FCN treaty. Depending on the language of the particular FCN
treaty, an argument could be made that only certain senior-level personnel are
accorded the extraordinary protections of citizenship preference provisions.8 °
76. INA §§ 101(a)(15)(L), (a)(44)(A)-(C), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 l01(a)(15)(L), (a)(44)(A)-(C) (1988).
77. Id.
78. INA § 214(c)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(D) (1988).
79. INA § 203(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3).
80. Cf. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1141 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 904 (1989).
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If, in a given case, only certain categories of personnel are considered as
included within the FCN treaty's protected class, then further inquiry must be
made concerning the actual representations made by the company and the visa
applicant to the U.S. consul and the actual basis upon which the consul deter-
mined that E visa classification was appropriate. This inquiry is made more
difficult, however, because, as noted above, E visa stamps typically bear no
special annotation describing the particular subcategory (for example, executive,
supervisor, or essential-skills) that formed the basis for the consul's issuance of
an E visa in an individual case.
E. DoEs QUASAR PROTECT EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS FOR
"OTHER-THAN-E" NONIMMIGRANT WORK-VISA CATEGORIES?
Assuming that all E visaholders are considered part of the protected FCN
treaty class, the question nonetheless arises whether citizenship preference de-
cisions affecting other nonimmigrant workers with treaty country nationality, for
example, L-1, H-1B, and the like, are also immune from charges of national
origin discrimination under the treaty.
The courts in Quasar never addressed this question. Employers may argue that
conferral of an E visa is not a prerequisite to FCN treaty coverage, and that, so
long as an individual could have been found eligible for an E visa, citizenship
preference interpretation of the FCN treaty under Quasar ought to prevail. Under
this analysis, employment decisions are immune from national origin discrimi-
nation attack by virtue of the FCN treaty if they involve any person with treaty-
country citizenship who could have obtained an E visa but instead entered on
some other nonimmigrant or immigrant visa.
While this analysis may be plausible, the several distinctions in visa practice,
procedure, and substantive law between E and other nonimmigrant categories
suggest that citizenship preference provisions in FCN treaties may indeed be
limited to the E visa category. Thus, had some of the Japanese executives or
managers in Quasar entered the United States as L- 1 intracompany transferees
or H-lB professional workers, then possibly, the FCN treaty could have been
found to be inapplicable to such "other-than-E" personnel. Such an interpreta-
tion could well have resulted in an affirmance of the substantial title VII
judgment awarded by the lower court on the basis of national origin discrimi-
nation. Given that, over the past few years, many Japanese and other treaty-
country entities with significant U.S. operations have opted in greater numbers
for L- 1 or H- IB rather than E visas, and in light of the increasing invocation of
national-origin discrimination claims by American employees of foreign-owned
companies, little time may pass before the issue is joined and resolved in the
courts.
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III. U.S. Tax Law Issues for Foreign
Corporations and Their U.S. Subsidiaries
That Invoke Treaty Rights
A. THE RISK OF ADVERSE U.S. TAX CONSEQUENCES FOR A
FOREIGN CORPORATION FROM THE PERFORMANCE OF AcTivrrTEs
OTHERWISE THOUGHT TO BE PROTECTED BY TREATY
Commentators claim that the Quasar case is a most favorable decision for
foreign corporations with subsidiary operations in the United States because the
court "fully sanctioned" the staffing of executive level positions in the United
States with foreign nationals employed by the foreign parent corporation. How-
ever, in Quasar, the court relied wholly and exclusively on an applicable FCN
treaty to conclude that the subject activities were not discriminatory, and accord-
ingly, not in violation of U.S. laws.
The Quasar decision is not the panacea many claim it to be. The very activities
that the court in Quasar concluded to be nondiscriminatory are just the type of
activities likely to raise a significant and potentially costly U.S. tax issue. In-
deed, U.S. tax authorities have recently stated that they are scrutinizing the U.S.
activities of agents for foreign corporations to determine if the activities dem-
onstrate that the foreign corporation is engaged in a trade or business within the
United States. In the view of U.S. tax authorities, the performance in the United
States of activities similar to those described in Quasar by employees of a
foreign corporation could very well cause the foreign corporation to be engaged
in a trade or business within the United States and subject to U.S. income tax.
It would be a gross and potentially costly error to assume, in this context, that an
applicable FCN treaty will provide any sort of protective shield for a foreign
corporation (or its U.S. subsidiary) from U.S. taxation.
Specifically, the U.S. tax issue not addressed in Quasar is whether the practice
of a Japanese parent corporation assigning Japanese executive-level employees
to its U.S. subsidiary to perform business-related activities in the United States
at the U.S. office of the U.S. subsidiary would create a "permanent establish-
ment" of the Japanese parent corporation in the United States. If a "permanent
establishment" of the Japanese corporation in the United States is created, the
Japanese corporation would be subject to U.S. tax on the income attributable to
that U.S. permanent establishment.
The risk that a Japanese corporation (or any foreign corporation) has a "per-
manent establishment" in the United States by reason of the activities of its
agents in the United States is very real and cannot be overemphasized. This is
especially true given that U.S. tax authorities are dedicating more resources and
increasing their efforts to identify U.S. permanent establishments of Japanese
corporations in such circumstances.
Whether a "permanent establishment" of the Japanese corporation in the
United States is created by the activities of its agents is determined under the
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provisions of the U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty. The FCN treaty between the
United States and Japan has absolutely no relevance in this context, and there-
fore, can afford no protection to the Japanese corporation.
Thus, the relevant provisions of the U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty are most
important in assessing the risk that a Japanese corporation has a permanent
establishment in the United States by reason of the activities of its agents in the
United States. Accordingly, those tax treaty provisions and certain U.S. tax laws
are now reviewed to describe the risk and to provide some guidance as to the
types of agent activities that are likely (or not likely) to create a permanent
establishment of the Japanese corporation in the United States.
The facts in Quasar concerning the activities of the Japanese employees were
sketchy, at best. Accordingly, the following hypothetical facts have been devel-
oped for the purpose of analyzing the risk that a Japanese parent corporation will
be deemed to have a U.S. permanent establishment by reason of the activities of
its agents in the United States.
81
Assume that a U.S. subsidiary corporation purchases goods from its Japanese
parent corporation and resells the goods in its own name in the United States.
Certain Japanese nationals, employed by the Japanese parent corporation, are
sent to the United States to collect information on the U.S. market for the
Japanese parent corporation's goods and conduct managerial (financial and mar-
keting) activities relating to the U.S. subsidiary corporation's business opera-
tions. The activities of the Japanese employees are performed at the U.S. sub-
sidiary's U.S. office.
The Japanese nationals are under the day-to-day control of the U.S. subsidiary
corporation, but also receive instructions from the Japanese parent corporation.
The Japanese nationals collect their salaries from the U.S. subsidiary corpora-
tion, but they are designated as "Japanese parent corporation personnel" on the
U.S. subsidiary's books. The U.S. subsidiary is reimbursed by the Japanese
parent corporation for the salaries paid to the Japanese nationals. When the
Japanese nationals complete their work assignments in the United States, they
transfer back to Japan, and other Japanese nationals employed by the Japanese
parent corporation come to the United States to assume the vacated positions.
Based on the facts as presented, the most significant issue is whether the
Japanese nationals would be considered dependent agents of the Japanese parent
81. For ease of discussion, a Japanese corporation is used as the focus in this part of the article,
and references are made to the U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, Convention for Avoidance of Double
Taxation, Mar. 8, 1971, U.S.-Japan, 23 U.S.T. 967 [hereinafter U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty].
However, the analysis contained herein would be equally applicable to any foreign corporation,
where the United States has entered into an income tax treaty with the country in which the foreign
corporation is considered resident for tax purposes. Though the hypothetical facts developed for
purposes of this portion of the article are similar to those contained in Quasar, no inference with
respect to the U.S. tax treatment of Quasar, or its Japanese affiliates, is intended, and none should
be drawn from this portion of the article.
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corporation. If the Japanese nationals are considered dependent agents of the
Japanese parent corporation, then the greatest risk of the Japanese parent cor-
poration having a permanent establishment in the United States derives from the
use of the U.S. subsidiary's U.S. office by the Japanese nationals on a regular
and continual basis to perform business-related activities for the Japanese parent
corporation. In such a case, the Japanese parent corporation could very well have
a fixed place of business in the United States, and thereby, a permanent estab-
lishment in the United States.
If the Japanese nationals are considered dependent agents of the Japanese
parent corporation, a second, separate risk arises that the Japanese parent cor-
poration could have a U.S. permanent establishment. This second risk is present
even if it is determined that the Japanese parent corporation does not have a fixed
place of business in the United States. A permanent establishment of the foreign
corporation could exist if the Japanese nationals have, and habitually exercise in
the United States, authority to conclude contracts for the Japanese parent cor-
poration that directly relate to the Japanese parent corporation's business oper-
ations. Given the facts as presented, this second risk does not appear to be as
significant as the first risk identified previously.
B. THE REACH OF UNITED STATES TAXING JURISDICTION
OVER A FOREIGN CORPORATION
Under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code,8 2 a foreign corporation "engaged in
a trade or business within the United States" is subject to U.S. income tax at
regular corporate income tax rates on income "effectively connected" with the
conduct of a U.S. trade or business. 83 If a foreign corporation is engaged in a
U.S. trade or business, it must file a U.S. federal income tax return.84 If the
foreign corporation is engaged in a U.S. trade or business and fails to file a U.S.
tax return, the foreign corporation may be denied the benefit of any allowable
deductions and credits in calculating its U.S. taxable income.
85
Regardless of whether a foreign corporation is engaged in a trade or business
within the United States, a U.S. tax treaty may prevent the imposition of U.S.
tax on the income of the foreign corporation. 86 U.S. tax treaties normally exempt
business profits of a foreign corporation from U.S. tax, provided that the foreign
82. All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code [I.R.C.] of 1986, 26 U.S.C.
§ I et seq., as amended.
83. See I.R.C. § 882(a)(1) (1988); see also I.R.C. § 864(b) (1988) (concerning a "trade or
business within the United States"), 864(c) (1988) (concerning "effectively connected" income).
84. See I.R.C. § 6012(a)(2) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(g) (1960). If the foreign corporation
is engaged in a trade or business in the United States, a tax return must be filed even if its income
is exempt from income tax by reason of an applicable income tax treaty. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-
2(g)(l)(i) (1960).
85. See I.R.C. § 882(c)(2) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.882-4(b) (1990).
86. See I.R.C. § 894(a) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1(a) (1973) (income is not included in gross
income and is exempt from U.S. income tax to the extent required by an applicable U.S. tax treaty).
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corporation has no "permanent establishment" in the United States. 87 Accord-
ingly, under an applicable U.S. tax treaty, a foreign corporation generally will be
subject to U.S. income tax only on profits derived from carrying on a business
through a "permanent establishment" in the United States.
88
C. THE EXISTENCE OF A PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION
IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER AN APPLICABLE TAX TREATY
A "permanent establishment" is defined in most U.S. tax treaties as a fixed
place of business through which the business of a foreign corporation is wholly
or partly carried on.89 A "fixed place of business" covers any premises, facil-
ities, or installations used for carrying on the business of the foreign corporation,
even if they are not exclusively used for that purpose. 90 Furthermore, a "fixed
place of business" may be situated in the business facilities of another entity.
91
87. See, e.g., U.S. Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty, 1981, art. 7(1), reprinted
in MODEL INCOME TAX TREATIES (Kees Van Raad ed., 1990) [hereinafter MODEL TREATIES]. See also
OECD Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital, 1977, art. 7(1), reprinted in
MODEL TREATIES, supra. In older U.S. tax treaties, the term "industrial or commercial profits" is
used instead of "business profits." See, e.g., U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, supra note 81, art. 8.
Both terms have essentially the same meaning, that is, profits derived from any trade or business
activity conducted through a permanent establishment in the country.
In 1963, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) prepared a draft
model income tax treaty that served as the basis for treaty negotiations among the industrialized
countries. OECD Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital, 1963 reprinted in
MODEL TREATIES, supra. This model treaty was revised in 1977 to reflect later changes in OECD
countries' tax laws. OECD Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital, 1977,
reprinted in MODEL TREATIES, supra [hereinafter OECD Model Treaty].
The United States has used a variation of the OECD Model Treaty as a starting point in its treaty
negotiations. In 1977, based on the OECD Model Treaty, the U.S. Treasury Department developed
a U.S. model income tax treaty to reflect the U.S. position in treaty negotiations. This model was
revised in draft form in 1981 to reflect the changes in U.S. tax treaty policy. U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment's Model Income Tax Treaty, 1981 [hereinafter U.S. Model Treaty].
88. The term "permanent establishment" is used solely in treaties, and therefore, its interpre-
tation should be derived from the treaty context. Though a treaty term, "permanent establishment"
is considered similar in meaning to the term "office or other fixed place of business," as used in
I.R.C. Code § 864(c)(4)(B) (1988). Accordingly, reference will be made to the Treasury regulations
issued under § 864(c)(4)(B) [Treas. Reg. § 1.864-7], which defines permanent establishment as an
"office or other fixed place of business," where such reference may aid in understanding the term
"permanent establishment."
89. See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 87, art. 5(1); OECD Model Treaty, supra note 87,
art. 5(1). In the U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, "permanent establishment" is defined as "a fixed
place of business through which a [foreign corporation] engages in industrial or commercial activity."
See U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, supra note 81, art. 9(1). The meaning of "permanent estab-
lishment" in these treaties is viewed as effectively the same.
90. In connection with the OECD Model Treaty, official commentaries were prepared which
provide significant "legislative history." These commentaries have been relied upon by U.S. courts
in interpreting U.S. treatyprovisions. See e.g., United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co. Ltd., 525 F.2d
9, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976). Accordingly, reference is to these com-
mentaries on the OECD Model Treaty when such reference aids in understanding the meaning of
specific treaty concepts. In particular, the commentary on the definition of "permanent establishment"
will be substantially referenced [hereinafter OECD Commentary]. See OECD Commentary 4.
91. OECD Commentary 4.
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A "fixed place of business" includes, but is not limited to: (a) a place of man-
agement; (b) a branch; (c) an office; (d) a factory; (e) a workshop; and (f) a mine,
an oil or gas well, a quarry, or other place of extraction of natural resources.92
A U.S. office or fixed place of business of a subsidiary corporation will not,
in itself, constitute a "permanent establishment" of the foreign parent corporation
in the United States. 9 3 The foreign parent corporation must carry on some portion
of its business activities through the office or fixed place of business before it will
be considered a "permanent establishment" of the foreign parent corporation.
94
The business of a foreign corporation is carried on mainly by the persons who are
in a paid employment relationship with the foreign corporation.
95
Thus, the first issue is whether the U.S. subsidiary's U.S. office is a "fixed
place of business" of the Japanese parent corporation in the United States.
Simply because the U.S. subsidiary corporation maintains an office in the United
States will not, in itself, create a "permanent establishment" of the Japanese
parent corporation in the United States.9 6 Furthermore, the fact that the U.S.
subsidiary corporation resells in its own name in the United States, goods pur-
chased from the Japanese parent corporation will not, in itself, be sufficient to
create a "permanent establishment" of the Japanese parent corporation in the
United States.97
92. See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 87, art. 5(2); and OECD Model Treaty, supra note
87, art. 5(2). The U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty does not include "a place of management" within
the meaning of the term "permanent establishment." See U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, supra note
81, art. 9(2). These treaties also provide that certain building sites, and construction and installation
projects are permanent establishments. See U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 87, art. 5(3); OECD
Model Treaty, supra note 87, art. 5(3); U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, supra note 81, art. 9(2)(g).
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.864-7(b)(1) (1991) (defining "fixed facilities" through which a foreign
corporation engages in a trade or business within the United States under U.S. statutory tax law).
93. See, e.g., Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 87, art. 5(7); OECD Model Treaty, supra
note 87, art. 5(7); U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, supra note 81, art. 9(6). This follows from the
principle that, for the purpose of taxation, such a subsidiary corporation constitutes an independent
legal entity. Even the fact that the trade or business carried on by the subsidiary corporation is
managed by the foreign parent corporation will not cause the subsidiary corporation to be a perma-
nent establishment of the foreign parent corporation. See OECD Commentary, supra note 90, 39.
94. See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 87, art. 5(1); OECD Model Treaty, supra note 87,
art. 5(1); and U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, supra note 81, art. 9(1). The activity need not be
permanent in the sense that there is no interruption of operation, but operations must be carried out
on a regular basis. See OECD Commentary, supra note 90, 7.
95. See OECD Commentary, supra note 90, $ 9.
96. See U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, supra note 81, art. 9(6). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.864-7(d)(1)
(1991), which provides that a U.S. office or other fixed place of business of a dependent agent
(including a subsidiary corporation) of a foreign corporation will not affect the determination of
whether the foreign corporation has a U.S. office or other fixed place of business, unless the agent
has the authority to negotiate and conclude contracts in the name of the foreign corporation and
regularly exercises that authority, or has a stock of merchandise belonging to the foreign corporation
from which it regularly fills orders on behalf of the foreign corporation.
97. See U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, supra note 81, art. 9(6). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.864-7(d)(1)
(1991) (providing that the purchase of a foreign parent corporation's goods by a U.S. subsidiary for
resale in its own name does not create a U.S. "office or other fixed place of business" for the foreign
parent corporation under I.R.C. § 864(c)(4)(B) (1988)).
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However, if the Japanese nationals employed by the Japanese parent corpo-
ration are dependent agents of the Japanese parent corporation, and if the Jap-
anese nationals use the U.S. subsidiary's U.S. office on a regular and continual
basis, their activities could result in the characterization of the U.S. subsidiary's
U.S. office as a "fixed place of business" of the Japanese parent corporation in
the United States. 98 Thus, given the facts as presented, a "permanent establish-
ment" of the Japanese parent corporation in the United States exists, if at all, by
reason of the activities of the Japanese employees.
D. THE HAZARDS TO A FOREIGN CORPORATI1ON OF USING A DEPENDENT
AGENT TO PERFORM BUSINESS AcrIvITIEs IN THE UNITED STATES
The use of an independent agent in the United States by a foreign corporation
will not cause the foreign corporation to have a permanent establishment in the
United States even if the independent agent carries on the business of the foreign
corporation in the United States, provided that the independent agent is acting in
the ordinary course of its business. 99 To be an independent agent, the individual
(or entity) must be legally and economically independent of the foreign corpo-
ration (principal).' °° If the individual's (or entity's) business activities for a
foreign corporation are subject to detailed instructions or comprehensive control
by the foreign corporation, the individual (or entity) generally will not be treated
as independent of the foreign corporation., 01
Under the facts as presented, the Japanese employees are under the day-to-day
control of the U.S. subsidiary corporation and their managerial activities directly
relate to the U.S. subsidiary corporation's business operations. However, the
Japanese employees also receive instructions from the Japanese parent corpora-
tion. The information collection activities of the Japanese employees concern
sales of the Japanese parent corporation's products in the U.S. market (though
the same products are sold by the U.S. subsidiary corporation). The Japanese
employees are designated as "Japanese parent corporation personnel" on the
U.S. subsidiary's books, and the Japanese parent corporation bears the economic
burden (the salaries) of the Japanese employees concerning their activities in the
United States.
Because the Japanese parent corporation's and the U.S. subsidiary corpora-
tion's businesses are so highly integrated, it is difficult to determine whether the
activities performed by the Japanese c mployees are for and on behalf of the
98. See OECD Commentary, supra note 90, 9. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.864-7(e) (1991). This issue
is addressed in the text at subpart D. 1.
99. See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 87, art. 5(6); OECD Model Treaty, supra note 87,
art. 5(6); and U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, supra note 81, art. 9(5). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.864-
7(d)(2)-(3) (1991) (office or other fixed place of business of independent agent not treated as office
or other fixed place of business of foreign corporation (principal)).
100. See OECD Commentary, supra note 90, $ 37.
101. id.
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Japanese parent corporation or the U.S. subsidiary corporation, or both. How-
ever, even without being able to draw a definitive line between the activities
performed by the Japanese employees for the Japanese parent corporation and
those performed for the U.S. subsidiary corporation, the Japanese parent corpo-
ration clearly instructs and exercises control over the Japanese employees. Thus,
there appears to be sufficient factual support for a finding that Japanese employ-
ees are dependent agents for the Japanese parent corporation, or at least, a
significant risk that the Japanese employees would be treated by U.S. tax au-
thorities as dependent agents for the Japanese parent corporation. 102
1. The Risk That the Dependent Agent's Use of Another Entity's
U.S. Office Creates a Fixed Place of Business for the Foreign
Corporation in the United States
Assuming for the sake of argument that the Japanese employees are dependent
agents for the Japanese parent corporation, the next level of analysis concerns the
use by the Japanese employees of the U.S. subsidiary's U.S. office, and whether
such use creates a "fixed place of business" of the Japanese parent corporation
in the United States.10 3 If the U.S. subsidiary's U.S. office is considered to be
a "fixed place of business" of the Japanese parent corporation by reason of the
Japanese employees' use of the office, then the Japanese parent corporation will
have a "permanent establishment" in the United States. The Japanese parent
corporation then will be subject to U.S. income tax on the business profits
attributable to the U.S. permanent establishment. 104
Under the facts presented, the Japanese nationals are compensated employees
of the Japanese parent corporation who are assigned to work in the United States
at the U.S. subsidiary's U.S. office on a regular and continual basis. When a
Japanese employee completes his work assignment in the United States, he
transfers back to Japan. The departing Japanese employee is replaced by another
Japanese employee who assumes the departing employee's position at the U.S.
subsidiary's U.S. office. Accordingly, the Japanese parent corporation regularly
102. Id.
103. It makes no difference whether the Japanese employees, as dependent agents of the Japanese
parent corporation, are authorized to conclude contracts on behalf of the Japanese corporation if they
work at a "fixed place of business" of the Japanese corporation in the United States. See id. $ 7. See
text at subpart D.2. for a discussion concerning the creation of "permanent establishment" of a
foreign corporation by reason of a dependent agent with authority to conclude contracts on behalf of
the foreign corporation.
104. See U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, supra note 81, arts. 9(1), (9)(2)(b). The "business
profits attributable to the permanent establishment" of the Japanese parent corporation in the United
States are determined under the provisions of the U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, (and, to a lesser
extent, under U.S. tax laws). See id. arts. 8, 11. Generally, in calculating the business profits
attributable to the U.S. permanent establishment of the Japanese parent corporation, as well as the
profits of the U.S. subsidiary corporation, income and deductions are allocated between the U.S.
subsidiary corporation and the Japanese parent corporation in accordance with the arm's length
standard. See I.R.C. § 482 (1988).
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and continually has compensated employees performing business-related activ-
ities at a specific location in the United States.
Under this arrangement between the Japanese parent corporation and its U.S.
subsidiary corporation, a definite risk exists that the U.S. subsidiary's U.S.
office, together with the regular and continual use of the office by the Japanese
employees (as dependent agents of the Japanese parent corporation) in the per-
formance of business-related activities, would create a "fixed place of business"
of the Japanese parent corporation in the United States. 
105
U.S. tax treaties provide, however, that a "fixed place of business" used only
for the following "exempt purposes" will not constitute a "permanent estab-
lishment" of the foreign corporation in the United States:
(a) the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display, or delivery
of goods or merchandise belonging to the foreign corporation;
(b) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the
foreign corporation solely for the purpose of storage, display, or delivery;
(c) the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the
foreign corporation solely for the purpose of processing by another per-
son;
(d) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of
purchasing goods or merchandise, or of collecting information, for the
foreign corporation;
(e) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of
carrying on, for the foreign corporation, any other activity of a prepara-
tory or auxiliary character;
(f) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for any combination
of the activities mentioned in subparagraphs (a) to (e). 106
If the U.S. subsidiary's U.S. office, together with the use of that office by the
Japanese employees (as dependent agents of the Japanese parent corporation),
creates a fixed place of business of the Japanese parent corporation in the United
States, the "permanent establishment" characterization can be avoided only if
the fixed place of business is used for exempt purposes. The exempt purposes
105. See OECD Commentary, supra note 90, $ 7, 9. In the case of a permanent establishment
of a foreign corporation, the business of the foreign corporation is carried on, on a regular basis,
mainly by persons who are in a paid-employment relationship with the foreign corporation.
106. See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 87, art. 5(4); OECD Model Treaty, supra note 87,
art. 5(4); U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, supra note 81, art. 9(3). Exception (e), in particular, is
significant, as it functions as a "miscellaneous category" by which a foreign corporation can avoid
the creation of a U.S. permanent establishment. For example, a foreign corporation with an office or
fixed place of business in the United States will not have a permanent establishment in the United
States, as long as the activities conducted at the office or fixed place of business are "preparatory or
auxiliary in character." Also note that I.R.C. § 864(c)(4)(B), and the regulations thereunder, do not
provide a similar list of exceptions to the definition of an "office or other fixed place of business."
Accordingly, this list of exceptions under a U.S. tax treaty, taken as a whole, suggests that the
concept of an "office or other fixed place of business" under I.R.C. § 864(c)(4)(B) is something
broader than that meant by the term "permanent establishment" under an applicable U.S. tax treaty.
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that may apply, given the facts as presented, are the exceptions for a fixed place
of business of the Japanese parent corporation that is maintained for the purpose
of (a) collecting information or (b) carrying on activities that are preparatory or
auxiliary in character.
Accordingly, the first inquiry is whether the Japanese employees' activities can
be viewed as the mere collection of information for the Japanese parent corpo-
ration. Certain Japanese employees are charged with collecting information for
the Japanese parent corporation concerning the U.S. market for the Japanese
parent corporation's goods. If that is the particular Japanese employees' sole
responsibility, and their activities in the United States relate only to the collection
of U.S. market-related information for the Japanese parent corporation, it ap-
pears that the activities of those particular Japanese employees performed at a
fixed place of business of the Japanese parent corporation in the United States
would not make the fixed place of business a "permanent establishment" of the
Japanese parent corporation in the United States. 
10 7
However, the managerial activities performed by the Japanese employees for
the Japanese parent corporation at a fixed place of business of the Japanese
corporation in the United States are not likely to be considered performed for an
exempt purpose. Only if it can be said that these managerial activities are "pre-
paratory or auxiliary" in character, can the Japanese parent corporation avoid
having a permanent establishment in the United States by reason of its fixed place
of business in the United States.
In the Commentary to the 1977 OECD Model Treaty (a model income tax
treaty upon which many U.S. tax treaties are based, including the U.S.-Japan
Income Tax Treaty) the function of managing a corporation, even if it covers
only a certain area of the operations of the corporation, is said to "constitute an
essential part of the business operations of the [corporation], and therefore, can
in no way be regarded as an activity which has a preparatory or auxiliary char-
acter . . ,, 108
Perhaps the argument could be made that the managerial activities performed
by the Japanese employees in the United States concern only the business op-
erations of the U.S. subsidiary, as an entity separate and distinct from the Jap-
anese parent corporation, and not the business operations of the Japanese parent
corporation. If the managerial activities relate only to the business operations of
the U.S. subsidiary, then there would be no U.S. business activity to attribute to
the Japanese parent corporation. However, given that dependent agents for the
Japanese parent corporation perform the managerial activities, it follows that the
107. See U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, supra note 81, art. 9(3)(d). The OECD Commentary
concerning this exempt purpose is not especially helpful. It indicates that the collection of informa-
tion is intended to include the case of a newspaper bureau which has no purpose other than to act as
one of many "tentacles" of the parent body; to exempt such a bureau is to do no more than to extend
the concept of "mere purchase." See OECD Commentary, supra note 90, 21.
108. OECD Commentary, supra note 90, 23.
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managerial activities of the Japanese employees, at least in part, relate to the
business operations of the Japanese parent corporation and not solely to the
business operations of the U.S. subsidiary. Thus, it appears that this argument
would be most difficult to make and support with the facts as presented. This is
especially true given the high degree of integration between the U.S. subsidiary's
and the Japanese parent corporation's business operations.
For these reasons the managerial activities of the Japanese employees are not
likely to be considered "preparatory or auxiliary" under the U.S.-Japan Income
Tax Treaty. Since the Japanese parent corporation has a fixed place of business
in the United States, and its dependent agents perform managerial activities at the
fixed place of business, the fixed place of business of the Japanese parent cor-
poration would likely constitute a "permanent establishment" of the Japanese
parent corporation in the United States.
Accordingly, a definite risk remains that the Japanese parent corporation has a
"permanent establishment" in the United States by reason of the activities of the
Japanese employees, and thereby, is subject to U.S. income tax.
2. A Dependent Agent Should Not Have and Habitually Exercise in the
United States Authority to Conclude Contracts for the Foreign Corporation
Even if it is determined that the Japanese parent corporation does not have a
fixed place of business in the United States, the Japanese parent corporation still
may have a permanent establishment in the United States by reason of the
activities of the Japanese employees (as dependent agents of the Japanese parent
corporation). Under U.S. tax treaties, if a dependent agent acts on behalf of the
foreign corporation, and has, and habitually exercises in the United States,
authority to conclude contracts in the name of the foreign corporation, the for-
eign corporation will have a "permanent establishment" in the United States.' 09
This authority to conclude contracts must cover contracts relating directly to
the business operations of the foreign corporation. It would be irrelevant, for
instance, that the dependent agent has authority to employ individuals to assist
him in his duties for the foreign corporation or is authorized to conclude in the
name of the foreign corporation contracts relating to internal operations only. " 1
0
Again assuming that the Japanese employees are dependent agents for the
Japanese parent corporation, a second, separate issue is whether the Japanese
employees "have and habitually exercise in the United States the authority to
conclude contracts in the name of the Japanese parent corporation.""' The
109. See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 87, art. 5(5); OECD Model Treaty, supra note 87,
art. 5(5); U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, supra note 81, art. 9(4).
110. See OECD Commentary, supra note 90, 32.
111. See U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty, supra note 81, art. 9(4). Under the U.S.-Japan Income
Tax Treaty (or any other U.S. tax treaty for that matter), if it is determined that the Japanese
corporation has a dependent agent in the United States, but does not have a fixed place of business
in the United States, the issue becomes whether the dependent agent "has and habitually exercises
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activities performed by the Japanese employees in the United States for the
Japanese parent corporation clearly relate to the generation of business profits.
However, the activities of the Japanese employees appear to concern either the
collection of U.S. market information for the Japanese parent corporation with
respect to its goods (an exempt purpose), or the internal operations of the Jap-
anese parent corporation, the U.S. subsidiary corporation, or both.
The Japanese employees' activities do not seem to involve traditional sales
activities for the Japanese parent corporation (that is, negotiating and concluding
product sales contracts). Accordingly, the facts as presented do not indicate that
the Japanese employees have and habitually exercise in the United States the
authority to conclude contracts in the name of the Japanese parent corporation
with respect to the business operations of the Japanese parent corporation. Thus,
while some risk exists that U.S. tax authorities would view the Japanese em-
ployees to have such authority and that the activities of the Japanese employees
are sufficient to create a "permanent establishment" of the Japanese parent
corporation in the United States, the risk does not appear to be as significant as
the first risk (identified above).
E. U.S. TAX AUTHORTIES ARE AGGRESSIVELY LOOKING FOR PERMANENT
ESTABLISHMENTS OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Reliable sources at the U.S. Internal Revenue Service have indicated that they
are closely scrutinizing the activities in the United States of foreign corporations
to determine if a U.S. permanent establishment of a foreign corporation may
exist. For example, IRS field agents supposedly have been instructed to review
all IRS Forms 6114 (on which treaty-based return positions are reported) as a
starting point for identifying the existence of U.S. permanent establishments of
foreign corporations. "12 Furthermore, these sources have indicated that the IRS
is prepared to take a position as to what constitutes a permanent establishment of
a foreign corporation in the United States and to designate specific cases for
litigation as appropriate.
A senior IRS official recently informed tax practitioners (off the record) that
the IRS believes that many of the activities currently being performed by a U.S.
subsidiary corporation or U.S. agent for a foreign corporation are sufficient to
in the first mentioned Contracting State [United States], an authority to conclude contracts in the
name of that resident [Japanese corporation]." If the Japanese corporation has no fixed place of
business in the United States, only if the dependent agent has (and habitually exercises) such
authority in the United States can the activities of the dependent agent create a permanent establish-
ment of the Japanese corporation in the United States.
112. A foreign corporation is exempt from I.R.C. § 6038A reporting requirements if it does not
have a permanent establishment in the United States. See I.R.C. § 6038A(a)(1) (1988); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6038A-1(c)(5)(i) (1992). See also text at subpart F. However, the foreign corporation must
timely file an IRS Form 6114, indicating its reliance on the business profits article of an applicable
U.S. tax treaty, to claim the exemption.
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give rise to a permanent establishment of the foreign corporation in the United
States. However, the lack of clear guidance on this issue has allowed foreign
corporations to avoid the U.S. permanent establishment characterization. The
IRS has announced that it plans to issue two revenue rulings, which will address
certain important aspects of the definition of a U.S. permanent establishment. 
11 3
1. An Anticipated New IRS Ruling on the Critical Distinction
Between an Independent Agent and a Dependent Agent
Based on information received from reliable sources within the IRS, the first
of these rulings will focus on the issue of whether a U.S. agent (individual or
subsidiary) for a foreign corporation is dependent or independent. The ruling will
provide a nonexclusive list of factors to be taken into account in determining
whether a U.S. agent of a foreign corporation is both "legally and economically
independent." 11 4 If, based on the factors contained in the revenue ruling, an
agent for a foreign corporation is not independent, then the activities of the
agent, if performed at a specific location and on a regular basis, could give rise
to a "fixed place of business," and thereby, a "permanent establishment" of the
foreign corporation in the United States.
2. An Anticipated New IRS Ruling on Whether Activities
Are Preparatory or Auxiliary in Character
The second revenue ruling will address the issue of what activities are "pre-
paratory or auxiliary" in character. As noted above, activities that are truly
"preparatory or auxiliary" generally are not treated as giving rise to a U.S.
permanent establishment for a foreign corporation even if the activities are con-
ducted at a fixed place of business of the foreign corporation in the United States.
This ruling will focus on whether or not the activity at the fixed place of business,
of itself, forms an "essential and significant part" of the activity of the foreign
corporation as a whole, and therefore, is not "preparatory or auxiliary" in
character. 11t5
The particular facts of the rulings are not known. However, given the IRS's
concern that many of the activities currently being performed by U.S. agents for
113. See Remarks of Christine Halphen, Senior Advisor, Office of IRS Associate Chief Couns.
(Int'l), at a World Trade Institute Seminar (Jan. 31, 1992), in TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 3, 1992, at
25-26.
114. See OECD Commentary, supra note 90, 36.
115. See id. 23. It is expected that this ruling will adopt, at least in part, the positions reflected
in the OECD Commentary. In the OECD Commentary, the function of managing a corporation
constitutes an essential part of the business operations of the corporation, and therefore, cannot be
regarded as an activity that is preparatory and ancillary in character. Accordingly, the ruling may go
so far as to suggest that, if a foreign corporation has a "management office" in the United States and
personnel of such office supervise and coordinate functions for the foreign corporation or divisions
of the foreign corporation (including a subsidiary of the foreign parent corporation, if their business
activities together comprise a single integrated business operation), a U.S. permanent establishment
of the foreign corporation will be found to exist.
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foreign corporations are sufficient to give rise to U.S. permanent establishments
of the foreign corporations, the list of factors in the first ruling will likely result
in a narrower definition of an "independent" agent, and the second ruling will
narrow the scope of the activities thought to be of a "preparatory or auxiliary"
character. Accordingly, as a result of these rulings, the risk is likely to increase
that a foreign corporation, like the hypothetical Japanese parent corporation
described in this part of the article, will be deemed to have a permanent estab-
lishment in the United States, by reason of the activities of its agents in the
United States.
F. NEW REPORTING RULES FOR U.S. CORPORATIONS GIVE THE IRS
MORE INFORMATION ON WHICH TO TAX FOREIGN AFFILIATES
Although not directly related to the issue of whether a foreign corporation has
a U.S. permanent establishment, emphasis is increasingly being placed by the
IRS (and the U.S. Congress) on the maintenance of, and IRS access to, tax-
related information and records of foreign corporations, even in situations where
the foreign corporation is not engaged in a U.S. trade or business and does not
have a permanent establishment in the United States.
Generally, under the Internal Revenue Code, a U.S. or foreign corporation that
conducts a trade or business in the United States and that is 25 percent owned by
foreign shareholders (reporting corporation) must file an information return re-
porting all transactions with related foreign persons." 6 However, the Code was
amended in 1989 to expressly authorize the IRS to examine books, records, and
other data in the custody of foreign persons that do not have a permanent estab-
lishment and are not engaged in a trade or business in the United States, in the
course of a tax audit of a U.S. corporation controlled by such foreign persons. 117
Prior to this amendment of the code, U.S. courts have enforced IRS sum-
monses for such materials against a foreign parent corporation that sells goods in
the United States through its U.S. subsidiary corporation. 18 However, Congress
believed that such summonses may not be practically and legally enforceable in
all appropriate cases, especially where summoned materials are in the possession
of a foreign person.l" 9 For example, the court based enforcement of the sum-
mons in Toyota120 on factors such as the interlocking membership on the boards
of directors of the foreign parent corporation and the U.S. subsidiary corpora-
116. See I.R.C. §§ 6038A, 6038C (1988); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6038A-I et seq. (1991).
117. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7403(d), 103 Stat.
2106, 2358 (1989) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 6038A(e) (1988)).
118. See United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 561 F. Supp. 354 (C.D. Cal.) (memorandum
opinion), 569 F. Supp. 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
119. See H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1296 (1989) (Explanation of Provisions
Approved by the Comm. on Fin. on Oct. 3, 1989, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1989)).
120. Toyota, 561 F. Supp. at 354.
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tion, and the foreign parent corporation's significant business activities in the
United States. 
121
To ensure that IRS examination requests and summonses involving related-
party transactions and U.S. taxpayers can be served on related foreign persons
that do not directly engage in a trade or business in the United States and for
which the other factors in the Toyota are not present, section 6038A(e) was added
to the code. Code section 6038A(e) provides that each foreign person that is a
related party of a U.S. taxpayer (reporting corporation) must agree to authorize
the reporting corporation to act as its agent to accept service of process and to
respond to any request or summons by the IRS for books, records, and other
information pertaining to transactions between the reporting corporation and
related foreign person. 1
22
Thus, the activities in the United States of foreign corporations, like the
Japanese parent corporation described above, most likely will continue to receive
a great deal of attention by U.S. tax authorities. Transactions between a U.S.
subsidiary corporation and its foreign parent corporation, in particular, will be
scrutinized by U.S. tax authorities, as they may provide a basis for U.S. income
tax adjustments (for example, under Code section 482), or the assertion that the
foreign parent corporation has a U.S. permanent establishment and is subject to
U.S. tax. Finally, the increased recordkeeping requirements for foreign-owned
U.S. corporations, and the ready access of the IRS to records and information
possessed by related foreign persons, will no doubt be utilized by the IRS in its
continuing effort to bring more foreign corporations within the U.S. taxing
jurisdiction.
As described above, the risk that a foreign corporation will be deemed to have
a permanent establishment in the United States by reason of its agents' (indi-
viduals or U.S. subsidiary) activities in the United States is likely to increase.
The issue of whether a foreign corporation has a permanent establishment in the
United States is determined principally under the provisions of an applicable
U.S. tax treaty and, to a lesser extent, under U.S. tax laws. Other applicable
treaties, for example, a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation, between
the United States and the foreign country, are wholly irrelevant in this context.
Accordingly, foreign corporations should pay close attention to the provisions of
an applicable U.S. tax treaty and U.S. tax laws and exercise extreme caution in
the structuring of their arrangements with employees, agents, and entities in the
United States.
121. See id. at 356.
122. See I.R.C. § 6038A(e)(1) (1988); see 'lso id. §§ 6038C(d)(1), 7602(a)(2).
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